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Several papers by Wiggins (building on ideas by Bo-
den) have outlined a view of creative concept genera-
tion as a very general search process, but that formal-
isation has not been developed much in the past few
years. Also, there are some aspects where clariﬁcation
or spelling out of details would be useful. We present a
re-formulation of the central ideas in Wiggins’s frame-
work, with slightly more rigorous statements of the def-
initions and a number of minor extensions. We also ex-
plain how this framework relates to some hitherto com-
pletely separate proposals by Ritchie.
Introduction
In recent years, there have been various formalisations of as-
pects of the computational creative process ((Pease, Winter-
stein, and Colton 2001), (Colton, Pease, and Ritchie 2001),
(Garcı´a et al. 2006), (Thornton 2007), (Colton, Charnley,
and Pease 2011)). Hence there is a consensus among at least
some established researchers that it is methodologically ben-
eﬁcial to have fully precise, detailed and formal accounts of
any mechanisms being considered as ‘creative’.
A prominent example is Wiggins’s creative systems
framework (CSF), presented in a number of papers (particu-
larly Wiggins(2006a; 2006b)). That framework emphasises
the notion of search as the central mechanism for simulating
creativity, and outlines how a metalevel search could repre-
sent some phenomena sometimes discussed as ‘transforma-
tional’ creativity. Although these ideas are very helpful in
clarifying the nature of creative computation, the published
versions of the CSF are at best a preliminary sketch: some
details are unspeciﬁed, some natural extensions are undevel-
oped, and there are some formal errors or infelicities. The
current paper starts from the central ideas of the CSF, but re-
deﬁnes the formal mechanisms in a way which leaves fewer
gaps, aspires to have fewer formal inconsistencies, and in-
cludes the description of more aspects of computationally
creative processes. The central motivation for this is that,
if we subscribe to a belief in the beneﬁts of formal models
(as noted above), then these models should not be left unde-
veloped, but should continue to be maintained, repaired, and
extended as necessary.
It is important to realise that the underlying intuitive ideas
– creation as the exploration of a ‘conceptual space’, and
possible ‘transformation’ of that space – have been set out
in numerous articles by Boden, with many illustrative ex-
amples from human creativity. Wiggins’s contribution was
to take those informal, broadbrush ideas and outline a for-
mal framework which both captured the core notions and
made sense computationally. The reader is referred to publi-
cations by Boden, Wiggins, and many others for more about
the intuitive motivation; our aim here is to reﬁne and extend
Wiggins’s proposals.
A summary of Wiggins’s CSF
Although this paper is centrally concerned with formalisa-
tion, we start with a very brief informal overview of the ideas
in the existing version of the CSF.
The framework posits a universal set of all concepts, a
term which covers both abstract ideas (e.g. a mathematical
theorem, a design for a better political system) and concrete
artefacts (e.g. a painting, a poem). Within this wide-ranging
set, there are particular types of idea/artefact (e.g. stories,
paintings, poems), and what counts as a recognisable exam-
ple of a story/painting/poem/etc. may be highly dependent
on socio-cultural norms. For many such creative genres, it
is not realistic for there to be a ﬁrm deﬁnition of acceptabil-
ity, as the speciﬁc concept may be vague in the sense of (van
Deemter 2010). That is, the extent to which a text is or is not
a well-formed story (or other artistic category) is a matter of
degree, rather than an all-or-nothing decision. Hence, within
the CSF, the criterion for acceptability/recognisability is rep-
resented as a rating between 0 and 1; in effect, the set of ex-
amples of a genre is treated as a fuzzy set. As well as whether
something falls within the deﬁnition of some artistic genre,
there is the separate question of whether it is a good (high
quality) instance (e.g. a profound poem, a beautiful paint-
ing). This is similarly a ‘vague’ notion, and again is rep-
resented within the CSF as a score between 0 and 1. This
means that an artefact can be an acceptable instance (e.g.
recognisably a story) without being of high quality (e.g. it
may be a poor story); hence the need for two different rat-
ings (mappings from concepts to values).
The inspiration for the CSF was the work of Boden(1998;
2003), in which creativity was described as occurring within
a conceptual space, which could be explored, or – in more
radical creativity – transformed into a new space. This
view has some resemblance to the traditional ideas of search
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within AI (Nilsson 1971), and Wiggins set out both to clar-
ify the relationship between conventional AI search and cre-
ative computation, and to provide a formal framework for
describing the latter. The idea is that a creative system starts
from some set of concepts, and by a series of steps cre-
ates further concepts one after another, thus ‘exploring the
space’. Although the term ‘creative’ has connotations of
‘construction’, the CSF, following the practice in formalis-
ing AI search, regards ‘new’ concepts as not so much ‘con-
structed’ as ‘reached’. That is, notionally all the possible
concepts are elements of some universal set, but the cre-
ative system computes a route through that set to particular
concepts, and those which have been thus reached represent
‘discoveries’ or ‘inventions’.
The exploration of the space of concepts (the search
method) is modelled by an operator which acts on a se-
quence of concepts (a list of the concepts the system has
already processed), and yields as its result a new (presum-
ably longer) list of concepts, which can then be processed in
turn as the next cycle of search. Sequences are used because
the search method, like an agenda-based AI search system,
has to maintain some record of where it has reached within
the space of available concepts, and what to work on next.
Wiggins points out that by separating the acceptability
rating from the search method, we can describe the situa-
tion where different composers, each with a personal way of
ﬁnding new artefacts (different search procedures) are work-
ing within the same style of music (a shared notion of ac-
ceptability). A creative agent should be able to recognise
something as being a recognisable artefact, or a high qual-
ity artefact, without necessarily having a search method that
would allow the agent to reach (create) that artefact.
More concretely, this is an intuitively plausible account of
certain potentially creative programs. The MCGONAGALL
poetry generator (Manurung, Ritchie, and Thompson 2012)
uses an explicit search mechanism (a genetic algorithm) to
ﬁnd suitable candidate texts. Each text must at least be syn-
tactically well-formed according to the system’s linguistic
grammar; this could be regarded as the acceptability map-
ping. During the search, items are scored for rhythmic suit-
ability and proximity to an initial semantic message; this
would be the quality mapping. At each stage, the system
keeps an ordered list of the current candidates, from which
each cycle in the search starts.
A small formal detail is that the CSF search operator takes
as arguments the two fuzzy criteria (for acceptability and
quality), and from there computes a way of going from an
existing concept-sequence to a new concept-sequence. This
means that the search method can be sensitive to these two
criteria if necessary, or that we can describe two systems as
having the same search strategy relative to their own differ-
ent deﬁnitions of validity and quality.
For Wiggins, the mappings (the two fuzzy sets and the
search mechanism) are to be represented as expressions in
some symbolic language, translatable to actual mappings.
Hence, in the CSF, an exploratory creative system consists
of the following seven components:
(i) the universal set of concepts
(ii) the language for expressing the relevant mappings
(iii) a symbolic representation of the acceptability mapping
(iv) a symbolic representation of the quality mappings
(v) a symbolic representation of the search mechanism
(vi) an interpreter for expressions like (iii) and (iv)
(vii) an interpreter for expressions like (v)
That constitutes the object level of the creative sys-
tem, which searches through concepts in the domain (e.g.
melodies). Wiggins also proposes that there can be a met-
alevel, which searches through possible object level sys-
tems to ﬁnd an interestingly different ‘conceptual space’,
thus modelling Boden’s idea of a ‘transforming’ the space.
The metalevel in CSF is structured in the same way as the
object level (i.e. the seven parts as set out above), except
that its set for exploration (i.e. its universal set) contains ex-
pressions in the symbolic language used at the object level.
In this way, the metalevel searches through expressions de-
scribing object-level systems, assessing these descriptions
for acceptability and for quality (using the metalevel’s crite-
ria for these two measures).
Relative to the published accounts of the CSF, the revi-
sions or extensions made here are:
• The symbolic language for expressing the various map-
pings is given a much less central role.
• The way in which the metalevel deﬁnes the object level is
explicitly stated. In particular, the notion of ‘transforma-
tion’ of an (object-level) space is deﬁned.
• Some minor inconsistencies in deﬁnitions are removed.
• We outline how search methods within the CSF can be
compared at the metalevel.
• The CSF is related to a proposal for formal assessment of
creative systems (Ritchie 2001; 2007).
The object level
The structure of an object level system
Wiggins posits the existence of one universal set, U , the set
of all concepts, but then deﬁnes a creative system as a tu-
ple, one component of which is the universal set. If the set
is truly universal across all systems, it should not need to
be mentioned as a deﬁning component of a speciﬁc system.
On the other hand, it would be useful to be able to allow
different creative systems to consider only speciﬁc subsets
of this hugely general set. The compromise here is to ac-
cept the existence of the wholly universal set, but for the
deﬁnition of each creative system to specify a subset of this
universe; this could, in principle, be a non-proper subset.
We will use P (mnemonic for ‘possibilities’) for these sub-
sets in our deﬁnitions, below. The idea is that U is universal
enough to contain concepts for every type of artefact that
might ever be conceived: it includes poems, stories, sculp-
tures, jokes, paintings, theorems, architectural plans, designs
for food mixers, etc. On the other hand P represents the
whole range of concepts within some narrower sphere, such
as two-dimensional arrays of coloured pixels (which could
act as a ‘universal’ set for the creation of visual art), or ﬁnite
sequences of words and punctuation (a possible ‘universal’
set for various textual artistic forms).
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Notation: For any sets A,B, BA denotes the set of map-
pings from A to B. In particular, for any set X , [0, 1]X
denotes the set of mappings from X to values between 0
and 1 inclusive. Since a fuzzy set is deﬁned by a mapping
from possible elements to values betwen 0 and 1, our fuzzy
sets of ‘acceptable’ elements and of ‘valuable’ elements will
be stated in this way; that is, as members of [0, 1]P . We
also take tuples(X) to denote the set of ﬁnite tuples (of any
length) of elements of the set X .
Deﬁnition 1:An exploratory creative system comprises:
(i) a subset P of U (possible concepts within this type or
genre)
(ii) N ∈ [0, 1]P , the acceptability mapping (mnemoni-
cally, this describes norms)
(iii) V ∈ [0, 1]P , the value mapping (mnemonically, this
describes value)
(iv) a mapping Q (the exploration scheme) from [0, 1]P ×
[0, 1]P to the set of mappings from tuples(P) to
tuples(P) (mnemonically, this describes a quest for
creations – ‘s’ for ‘search’ is used elsewhere).
The four components in our deﬁnition are direct counter-
parts of those in Wiggins’s CSF, but we have chosen differ-
ent symbols for the components of a system, to avoid confu-
sion; the relationships to Wiggins’s notation are: N ∼= [[R]],
V ∼= [[E ]], Q(N ,V) ∼= ��R, T , E��. The intuitive meanings
of the components are the same: P is the set of possible
concepts (e.g. arrays of pixels, sequences of words), N de-
ﬁnes the fuzzy set of acceptable instances of whatever do-
main/genre is being explored, V indicates how ‘good’ an in-
stance is, and Q deﬁnes how to explore the space.
The component Q, the search method, may need some
explanation. Directly following Wiggins’s proposals, Q is
applied to a particular N and V , and from that produces a
mapping which takes sequences of concepts into sequences
of concepts; hence, N and V could in principle inﬂuence
Q, or could be ignored. It might seem odd to describe Q as
taking these two parameters, when the only possible values
for the parameters seem to be ﬁxed as N and V – why not
just ‘compile in’ these two values, as they are speciﬁed in
the same 4-tuple package as Q? At present, this level of pa-
rameterisation has no real advantage, but it leaves open the
possibility, as the framework is elaborated, of considering a
‘transformed’ version of an exploratory creative system in
which Q is unchanged, but one or both of N , V are altered,
with automatic consequences for the operation of Q.
As in the original Wiggins formulation, Q(N , V) maps
from sequences of concepts to sequences of concepts, pro-
viding an agenda-like exploration of the set of possibilities,
with the sequence representing the current search state
As noted earlier, the CSF includes a symbolic language in
which mappings are expressed as rules, which are then inter-
preted into mappings. Here, we abstract away from the use
of a language, and deﬁne a creative system using mappings.
The advantage of this is that it states the essential relations
within a creative system without regard for representational
issues. In a later section, we show how the symbolic lan-
guage can be incorporated, directly reﬂecting the Wiggins
approach.
Characterising the conceptual space
As noted above, the basic deﬁnition of an exploratory cre-
ative system contains a fuzzy set, N , of concepts, which
are – intuitively – those concepts which conform to the cur-
rent norms of the domain. In Wiggins’s formulation, this
fuzzy set is not regarded as modelling Boden’s ‘conceptual
space’. Instead, Wiggins stipulates that conceptual spaces
are ordinary subsets (not fuzzy) of the universal set U , and
that the conceptual space C (of a given creative system) con-
sists of all concepts mapped by his [[R]] (our counterpart is
N ) to values greater than or equal to 0.5. Similarly, Wig-
gins deﬁnes the valued set as those concepts which his [[E ]]
(our equivalent is V) maps to values greater than or equal to
0.5. That is, although the CSF allows both these sets to have
graded membership (0 to 1), Wiggins immediately simpli-
ﬁes them to non-graded sets by imposing a threshold.
Within our formulation, the counterpart to Wiggins’s non-
fuzzy deﬁnitions would be as follows:
Deﬁnition 2: Given an exploratory creative system S =
(P ,N ,V,Q), we deﬁne, for any α ∈ [0, 1] andX ⊆ P:
(i) Nα(X) = {c ∈ X | N (c) > α} (the set of concepts
which reach the threshold α in their ‘normality’).
(ii) Vα(X) = {c ∈ X | V(c) > α} (the set of concepts
which reach the threshold α in their ‘quality’).
(iii) the fuzzy conceptual space of S isN (this just conﬁrms
the status of N as outlined earlier).
(iv) the conceptual space of S is N0.5(P) (this is for back-
wards compatibility with Wiggins’s 0.5 threshold).
(v) the fuzzy valued set of S is V (this just conﬁrms the
status of V as outlined earlier)..
(vi) the valued set of S is V0.5(P) (this is for backwards
compatibility with Wiggins’s 0.5 threshold).
Searching
In the CSF, the searching process begins from an initial set
of concepts. This is to allow for the situation where the cre-
ative system starts from some given concept set, represent-
ing the status quo. It is also useful later, when considering
metalevel search. In Wiggins’s deﬁnitions, exploration al-
ways starts from the single totally unspeciﬁed concept, �,
representing a situation in which the system has no known
concepts already. Here, we generalise this slightly.
If the sequences on which Q operates are to be like an
agenda in conventional AI search, then those sequences
should contain only items which have been produced from
previous steps of the search (i.e. applications of Q). This
means that the initial agenda has to include every item (con-
cept) which could ever participate in discoveries but is not
produced by an application of Q.
Wiggins deﬁnes ‘reachable’ concepts using indeﬁnitely
many applications of the search operator. There is a mi-
nor slip in his deﬁnition, in that repeated applications of
��R, T , E�� (which corresponds to our Q) will compute se-
quences (tuples) of concepts, not individual concepts. This
is easily remedied (and we can add an intermediate version,
for limited search). First we need a minor deﬁnition of all
the items appearing within a set of tuples:
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Deﬁnition 3: Given any set of tuples A, we deﬁne
elements(A) ≡
{x | ∃�y1, . . . , yn� ∈ A, ∃i 1 ≤ i ≤ n : x = yi}
The Wiggins formalisation deﬁnes all the concepts which
can be reached with any amount of search, i.e. without limit.
Although this case is of theoretical interest, in practice any
system will search only to some ﬁnite depth, and so we also
deﬁne the notion of ‘reachable in a ﬁxed number of steps’,
relying on the fact that a single application of the search
mapping Q corresponds to one step in the search process.
Deﬁnition 4: Given an exploratory creative system
(P ,N ,V,Q), and a setB ⊂ P of concepts (B is the starting
set of concepts for the search):




(i.e. any number of repeated applications of Q, up to
m; this describes search up to some depth.)




(i.e. any number of repeated applications of Q; this al-
lows any depth of search.)
(iii) the set of reachable concepts is the set reachable from
{�}. (This matches Wiggins’s notion, where all search
starts from a single unspeciﬁed concept).
(iv) the set of concepts reachable inm steps is the set reach-
able from {�} in m steps. (This is a bounded search
variant of Wiggins’s ‘start from nothing’ deﬁnition.)
In considering the behaviour of a creative system, it is
important to know which of its ﬁnal output (i.e. creations)
were provided to it initially and which were computed by
the system itself. We can deﬁne these thus:
Deﬁnition 5: Given an exploratory creative system
(P ,N ,V,Q), a subset B of P , and a set of concepts K
reachable fromB, the discoveries inK is the set of concepts
inK −B.
Wiggins deﬁnes the set of valued concepts as being those
concepts reachable from the undeﬁned concept, �, which
exceed a particular threshold value (0.5) when his ‘value’
mapping (our V) is applied. That deﬁnition can be restated
in the terminology here.
Deﬁnition 6: Given an exploratory creative system
(P ,N ,V,Q), where RC is the set of reachable concepts,
and a value α ∈ [0, 1]:
(i) the α-valued set of reachable concepts is Vα(RC).
(ii) the valued set of reachable concepts is the 0.5-valued
set of reachable concepts (i.e. V0.5(RC)); this mirrors
Wiggins’s deﬁnition.
The metalevel
Structure of the metalevel
For the metalevel, the ﬁrst matter to be clariﬁed concerns the
set of items used for exploration. In the Wiggins papers, this
is the set of possible expressions in a symbolic language L.
An expression in L is deﬁned earlier as deﬁning a rule-set
representing either R (acceptability rules), E (value rules)
or T (search rules), with different interpreters applying de-
pending on which of these is intended. If the metalevel is
considering single L-expressions, how does one such ex-
pression represent an entire object level system, which con-
tains all three of R, E , and T ? Within the language-based
formalisation, a possible response would be to say that L
must contain notation which allows one expression to rep-
resent three rule sets. If following this path, Wiggins’s def-
initions of the language interpreters would also have to be
patched. As we are separating out the language aspect, we
have a different solution.
Here, the object level space is deﬁned by the mappingsN ,
V , Q, so it seems reasonable to have the metalevel search-
ing through triples (N,V,Q) where N , V , Q, are possible
values for N , V , Q respectively (and hence are elements of
the appropriate sets such as [0, 1]P ). The exploration set at
the metalevel will be the set of such triples; for brevity here,
we will call this set of triples ECS(P) (as it is the set of
possible exploratory creative systems for P).
Given a subset P of U , a metalevel creative system for P
is an exploratory creative system made up of:
(i) ECS(P) (i.e. this is the metalevel’s set to explore)
(ii) an element Nmeta of [0, 1]ECS(P); this rates potential
object-level systems as to how ‘normal’ they are, thus
providing a (fuzzy) set of ‘acceptable’ triples (N,V,Q).
(iii) an element Vmeta of [0, 1]ECS(P); this rates potential
object-level systems as to their ‘quality’, thus providing
a (fuzzy) set of ‘valuable’ triples (N,V,Q).
(iv) a mapping Qmeta from [0, 1]ECS(P) × [0, 1]ECS(P)
to the set of mappings from tuples(ECS(P)) to
tuples(ECS(P)); this is structured like the search de-
vice Q in an object-level creative system, but operates
on elements of ECS(P) instead of P .
That is, the structure at the metalevel is exactly parallel to
the structure at the object level, as in the Wiggins version.
A metalevel has information about what an object level cre-
ative system should look like (Nmeta) and what would count
as a ‘good’ object level system (Vmeta). It also contains a way
of searching through potential object level systems (Qmeta).
Characterising an object level system
Given a deﬁnition of the components of a metalevel, it is
essential to then deﬁne exactly how the parts of the metalevel
characterise an object level system. This is not discussed in
detail by Wiggins, but he indicates that the metalevel is to
operate (in terms of search, etc.) exactly as an object level
creative system.
An object level creative system will ascribe various char-
acteristics to a set of concepts. Each concept will be: rated
(by N ) as to how acceptable it is as an member of the con-
ceptual space in question, rated (by V) as to its value/quality,
and deﬁned (by Q) as either reachable or not. As noted ear-
lier, Wiggins proposes that the ratings by (his equivalents of)
N and V are turned into non-fuzzy sets using a threshold.
However, even then the object level does not characterise a
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single object, or a unique set of systems: it deﬁnes three in-
dependent sets, viaN , V andQ. Since the metalevel has ex-
actly the same structure as an object level system, the items
which it explores (for Wiggins, expressions in a symbolic
language L) are presumably similarly allocated to 3 sets:
the recognisable, the valued and the reachable (and for Wig-
gins, reachability is always relative to �, not some speciﬁed
starting set of items). Hence, the metalevel is assigning (po-
tential) object level systems to these three categories. What
the metalevel does not do is characterise a single object level
system, or even a unique set of systems. This means that we
do not, from the published papers, have a deﬁnition of how
one object level system is a transformation of another, or
how a computation at the metalevel will yield a new object
level system – all that the metalevel provides is this tripar-
tite classiﬁcation. We will remedy this by deﬁning how a
metalevel can deﬁne (or transform) a speciﬁc object level
system.
In the next few deﬁnitions, we assume two ex-
ploratory creative systems Sobj = (P ,N ,V,Q) and
S�obj = (P ,N �,V �,Q�), and a metalevel system Smeta =
(ECS(P),Nmeta,Vmeta,Qmeta) for P . Where the relation
‘�=’ is used here, this allows for the two items in question to
have elements in common.
Deﬁnition 7:
(i) S�obj is a revision of Sobj using Smeta if S�obj is in the set
reachable from {Sobj} within Smeta, and S�obj �= Sobj .
(ii) for any α ∈ [0, 1], S�obj is α-valued with respect to
Smeta if Vmeta((N �,V �,Q�)) ≥ α.
(iii) S�obj is a transformation of Sobj using Smeta if S�obj is a
revision of Sobj using Smeta and also N �= N �.
Here we have taken a ‘transformation’ to be a revision in
which the deﬁnition of the conceptual space (acceptable set)
changes, as indicated by the condition ‘N �= N �’. As this
could be true even if N and N � differ only on one element,
proponents of transformation as a form of radical change
might wish to enhance this deﬁnition.
Relationship to the original CSF
To clarify the amendments we have made to the formali-
sation, we can compare it with the original version in the
papers by Wiggins. As mentioned earlier, the original CSF
includes a symbolic language in which the components (the
counterparts of ourN , V ,Q) are expressed. We can add this
to our framework by deﬁning a symbolic-language version
of an exploratory creative system, with appropriate links to
the deﬁnitions given above. In order to mimic Wiggins’s
deﬁnitions, we ﬁrst have to clarify certain aspects which are
unclear in the published papers. Sometimes the mapping
N (or what corresponds to this in Wiggins’s framework) is
represented as a single expression in a symbolic language,
and sometimes it is said to be a set of expressions. Either
of these accounts could be made to work, if applied consis-
tently. Here, we have opted for the single expression version,
with the observation that the symbolic language could con-
tain connective symbols such as ‘conjunction’, ‘disjunction’
or other logical operators, thereby getting the effect of a set
of rules in one syntactic expression.
Wiggins’s version does not separate clearly the deﬁnition
of the language from the speciﬁc language expressions used
in a particular creative system. We have tried to draw this
distinction in the next two deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 8: Given a set of concepts P , a creative systems
language for P is a tuple (A,LR,LT , [[.]], ��.��) where:
(i) A is a set of symbols, the alphabet.
(ii) LR and LT are languages over A (only 2 are needed
because the language LR can be used for both the ‘ac-
ceptability’ rules and the ‘value’ rules, since these both
describe fuzzy sets of concepts).
(iii) [[.]] is a mapping from LR to [0, 1]P (this is the inter-
preter which takes an expression in the symbolic lan-
guage and returns a mapping; that mapping is then a
fuzzy set of concepts).
(iv) ��.�� is a mapping from LR × LT × LR to
tuples(P)tuples(P) (this is the interpreter which turns
symbolic expressions specifying a search method into
an actual mapping to carry out the search).
The above deﬁnition (which is closely modelled on Wig-
gins’s proposals) provides the symbolic mechanisms, sepa-
rately from any particular creative system which might use
these representations. The next two deﬁnitions state how
these mechanisms can be used to deﬁne a speciﬁc system.
Deﬁnition 9: Given a set of concepts P and a creative sys-
tems language (A,LR,LT , [[.]], ��.��) for P , then a symboli-
cally represented exploratory creative system for P consists
of a tuple (WR,WE ,WT ) where:
(i) WR ∈ LR; the norms or acceptability rules.
(ii) WE ∈ LR; the rules assigning value to items.
(iii) WT ∈ LT ; rules which deﬁne the search method.
Deﬁnition 10: Given a set of concepts P , a creative systems
language (A,LR,LT , [[.]], ��.��), and a symbolically repre-
sented exploratory creative system SE = (WR,WE ,WT ),
then the exploratory creative system associated with SE is
the tuple S = (P,N ,V,Q) where
(i) N = [[WR]]; i.e. the meaning of this rule expression is
the normality mapping.
(ii) V = [[WE ]]; i.e. the meaning of this rule expression is
the value mapping.
(iii) Q(N ,V) = ��WR,WT ,WE��; i.e. the meanings of
these rule expressions give the search mapping.
(This directly mirrors the arrangement of Wiggins’s CSF.)
Using his formalisation, (Wiggins 2006a) provides a num-
ber of deﬁnitions of speciﬁc behaviours that a creative sys-
tem could display, in terms of what concepts are valued,
which can be reached, etc. These terms can all be deﬁned
within the formalisation given here, as follows, assuming
an exploratory creative system S = (P,N ,V,Q), and using
some of the terminology already deﬁned above:
Hopeless uninspiration: The valued set of concepts is
empty. That is, there are no concepts anywhere within
the universal set that meet the ‘quality’ threshold.
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Conceptual uninspiration: V0.5(N0.5(P)) = ∅. That is,
there are no concepts within the acceptable (‘normal’) set
of concepts that meet the ‘quality’ threshold.
Generative uninspiration: The valued set of reachable
concepts is empty. That is, there are no concepts which
the search mechanism can reach which meet the quality
threshold.
Aberration: Where B consists of exactly those elements in
the reachable set which are not in N0.5(P), aberration
occurs if B �= ∅. That is, aberration is when the search
mechanism goes outside the ‘normal’ set of concepts.
Perfect aberration is where V0.5(B) = B (i.e. all the non-
normal concepts meet the quality threshold); productive
aberration is where V0.5(B) �= ∅ and V0.5(B) �= B (i.e.
just some of the non-normal concepts meet the quality
threshold); pointless aberration is where V0.5(B) = ∅
(i.e. no non-normal concepts meet the quality threshold).
Evaluating search methods
Ventura’s analysis
Ventura(2011) gives an analysis of the limitations of unin-
formed search strategies in a creative context. His deﬁni-
tions and results are general enough that they should be ap-
plicable to the framework here, although there is one small
formal point that needs to be stipulated ﬁrst. Ventura (im-
plicitly) makes the following assumption:
One concept per step: Each formal ‘step’ in the search
process corresponds to the generation of exactly one
concept/artefact.
That is, Ventura’s analysis does not allow for intermediate
computational steps behind the scenes which do not directly
correspond to the generation of an artefact. The Wiggins
deﬁnitions (and our reformulations) do not demand this re-
striction, but it is a plausible constraint, and could be for-
malised thus:
Given an exploratory creative system (P,N ,V,Q), Q
is a one-concept-per-step scheme if, whenever z� =
Q(N ,V)(z), ∃c� ∈ P such that:
(i) c� is an element of z�;
(ii) c� is not an element of z;
(iii) for every element c of z� where c� �= c, c is an
element of z.
This perspective could be taken even further, by revising
our deﬁnition of an exploratory creative system to include
a set OP of operators, which are mappings from tuples of
concepts to concepts; that is, each operator is a member of
PPk for some integer k. Then we would stipulate that each
step in a search meets the constraint that it corresponds to
the invocation of one operator:
If two concept-sequences �c1, . . . , cn�, �d1, . . . , dm�
are such that Q(N ,V)(�c1, . . . , cn�) = �d1, . . . , dm�,
then:
there must be an operator p ∈ OP , and concepts
�e1, . . . , ek� (where k ≤ n) such that for every 1 ≤
i ≤ k, ei = cj for some j, and p(e1, . . . , ek) = dr for
some dr ∈ {d1, . . . , dm}, and dr /∈ {c1, . . . , cn}, and
∀di ∈ {d1, . . . , dm}, either i = r or di ∈ {c1, . . . , cn}.
Ventura’s analysis provides one possible formalisation of
the intuitive notion of a search strategy being ‘better’ (or
‘best’). It posits a set of target elements (concepts, in our ter-
minology) and considers the probability of the search reach-
ing one of these elements. In a footnote, Ventura also offers
a deﬁnition where the desirability of elements is a function
to [0, 1] (cf. our V), and computes the probability of reaching
an element with a maximal value.
It is arguable that in the area of creative systems, there is
less emphasis on ﬁnding speciﬁc target items (or even ﬁnd-
ing a maximal-scoring item) and more on generally reaching
acceptable or highly valued concepts (a direction in which
Ventura’s footnote moves). Our formalisation allows an al-
ternative perspective on the assessment or comparison of
search methods; see the next subsection.
Comparing search
Our formulation of the CSF allows the comparison of two
search methods according to how the concepts they reach are
rated by the related mappings N and V , taking into account
the depth of search involved. As we will want to apply cer-
tain deﬁnitions to various mappings (including N and V),
we will start with a general schematic deﬁnition in which
the mapping F can be anything of the appropriate type (so
F is not mnemonic for anything, being just a placeholder
for now). Also, AGG will stand for either AV G (arithmetic
mean) orMAX (maximum) of a function applied to a set.
Deﬁnition 11: Suppose there are two exploratory creative
systems (P ,N ,V,Q1) and (P ,N ,V,Q2), with Si(k, k�) =
the set of concepts reachable in no fewer than k and no more
than k� steps in these two systems (i = 1, 2). Also, F ∈
[0, 1]P (i.e. a rating of concepts, of some sort). Then
(i) Q1 has higher AGG F-values up to k� steps than Q2
if AGG(F , S1(0, k�)) > AGG(F , S2(0, k�)).
(ii) Q1 has higher AGG F-values beyond k steps than Q2
if AGG(F , S1(k, k�)) > AGG(F , S2(k, k�)) for any
k� > k.
This compares two variants of a system in which only the
search method Q is different. The above deﬁnitions will be
applied, below, to speciﬁc values for F .
Deﬁnition 12: Given a two exploratory creative systems
(P ,N ,V,Q1) and (P ,N ,V,Q2):
(i) Q1 is higher valued on average up to k steps than Q2
if Q1 has higher AVG V-values up to k steps than Q2.
(ii) Q1 is more normal on average up to k steps than Q2 if
Q1 has higher AVG N -values up to k steps than Q2.
(iii) Q1 achieves higher value up to k steps than Q2 if Q1
has higher MAX V-values up to k steps than Q2.
(iv) Q1 achieves greater conformity up to k steps than Q2
ifQ1 has higher MAXN -values up to k steps thanQ2.
For each of the 4 subparts of the above deﬁnition, we can
frame a corresponding deﬁnition which says that there exists
some depth k� after which one of the search methods Qi
gives a higher value than the other; e.g.:
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Q1 is higher valued eventually thanQ2 if there is some
integer k� > 0 such that Q1 has higher AVG V-values
beyond k� steps than Q2.
Similar substitutions can be made in the other deﬁnitions.
In this way, we have several ways of describing one search
method Q1 as being ‘better’ than another, Q2. Next, we
consider how comparisons of search methods can be more
detailed.
Descriptive criteria
Ritchie(2001; 2007) deﬁnes a set of formal criteria which
can be used to describe aspects of a potentially creative sys-
tem’s behaviour. Central to these formal criteria are two rat-
ing schemes for assigning values in [0, 1] to elements of the
set of basic items (i.e. the set of possible artefacts). One rat-
ing scheme (typ) represents typicality, indicating the extent
to which an item lies within the norm for this type of arte-
fact. The other rating (val) is for value, and indicates the
‘quality’ of an item. Ritchie’s typ and val, Wiggins’s R and
E and our N and V all appear to capture the same intuitive
notions: that we can rate possible creations as to their mem-
bership of a concept set, and in terms of the quality of such
creations.
There are some differences of nuance between Ritchie’s
constructs and those in the CSF, to which we will return
later, but for the moment let us consider how the central
ideas in some of Ritchie’s criteria could be used within the
CSF as stated here.
The ﬁrst eight of Ritchie’s criteria are stated in terms of
a result set, R, which is the set of artefacts produced by the
computer program, and the two ratings typ and val. There is
not space here to reproduce them all, but Criterion 7 illus-
trates the general idea:
ratio(Vγ,1(R) ∩ T0,β(R), T0,β(R)) > θ,
for suitable β, γ, θ.
where Vγ,1(R) is the set of elements of setRwhich are rated
above γ by val, T0,β(R) is the set of elements of R which
are rated below β by typ, and ratio computes the ratio of
the sizes of two sets. That is, this computes the proportion
of the untypical items which are of good quality.
Criteria like this could be applied to a creative system
(P ,N ,V,Q), using N to deﬁne Ti,j and V to deﬁne Vi,j .
There are various ways in which the result set R could be
deﬁned in terms of reachable concepts: all reachable con-
cepts? concepts reachable from a starting set B? concepts
reachable after some number of steps k? All of these are
plausible models of a ‘result set’. Hence there would be a
few families of very similar formula, parameterised accord-
ing to starting set or number of steps.
Ritchie(2007) emphasises that these criteria are not all
measures of creative success, but can be used to ‘proﬁle’
a (potentially) creative program by describing its behaviour
in more detail. In the same way, they could give a more
detailed picture of a creative system, in the CSF sense.
Ritchie also postulates an inspiring set, I , which are
the existing artefacts upon which the design of the cre-
ative program was based. The remaining criteria (9 - 18 in
Ritchie(2007)) make comparisons of different sorts between
I and the result set R. There is no exact counterpart within
the CSF, as there is no ‘design’ stage in the formalisation.
However, the formal structure of Ritchie’s criteria which in-
volve I could be coerced into service within the CSF, by
replacing I with some initial set of concepts B, from which
search starts. That is, where Ritchie has a criterion such as:
ratio(Vγ,1(R − I) ∩ Tα,1(R − I)), (R − I)) > θ, for
suitable α, γ, θ
(informally, ‘a high proportion of the novel results are both
highly valued and very typical of the genre’) we would have:
ratio(Vγ,1(R−B)∩Tα,1(R−B)), (R−B)) > θ, for
suitable α, γ, θ.
where R is the set of concepts reachable from B. (Again,
there is a possible variant where a number of steps k is stip-
ulated.)
Although this seems to indicate that we can simply port
the Ritchie criteria into the CSF, there is one further issue to
consider: there is a difference in the overall perspective of
the two formal accounts. There are various viewpoints one
could assume in devising a formal model in this area. For
example, it would be possible to have an abstract declarative
formalisation of the nature of the creative task, without in-
cluding any details of how this task might be executed. Or
a model might be proposed as describing (at some suitably
abstract level) how a creative system operates. Ritchie’s cri-
teria arguably take a third viewpoint, in which one treats the
program as a conveyor of input/output data, and attempts,
from an external viewpoint, to say more precisely how it
has performed. The typ and val mappings are certainly not
proposed as components of the program or system. Instead,
these are measures which might be applied by, for example,
having humans judge the program’s output.
In Wiggins’s CSF, the formal deﬁnitions of R and E (the
symbolic counterparts of ourN , V) would be compatible ei-
ther with a characterisation of the abstract nature of creativ-
ity, or with a model of a creative system. However, the termi-
nology used, and the inclusion of the T (‘agenda’) mapping
(our Q) determine that this is a model (at a very abstract
level) of the working of a creative system. Hence, the whole
intent of the CSF is radically different from that of Ritchie’s
deﬁnitions, even though there is a clear parallel between the
intuitive meanings of N and typ, V and val.
This means that what we have sketched above is not the
direction application of Ritchie’s criteria within the frame-
work, but the deﬁnition of counterparts within the CSF,
where the Ti,j and Vi,j mappings are deﬁned using inter-
nal components (N , V) of the system, not external judge-
ments. However, this means that if we are scrutinising the
behaviour of a creative system, we can apply the conditions
outlined above (i.e. the counterparts of Ritchie’s criteria) in
distinct ways:
Internal: How is the system performing, in its own terms?
For this, we use N and V to deﬁne Ti,j and Vi,j .
External: How is the system performing, in terms of inde-
pendent measures such as human judgements? For this,
we use the independent measures to deﬁne Ti,j and Vi,j .
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In both of these, we retain the notions ofB (initial set) andR
(reachable concepts) discussed above. Given that the set of
reachable concepts is in effect the ‘result set’, if the inspiring
set I is known, then using I instead of B, with an External
perspective, is effectively the scenario in the Ritchie papers.
These various adaptations of the criteria to the CSF can be
viewed alongside the deﬁnitions in our section Comparing
search above, and provide a slightly ﬁner grained and more
detailed vocabulary for comparing search strategies.
Guiding the metalevel
We have already shown how the metalevel of a creative
system can start from an existing object level system and
search for a variant system, using a metalevel value func-
tion Vmeta. What should the content of Vmeta be? Since
the metalevel has access to the object level mappings N
and V , it would be possible for Vmeta to be deﬁned using
composite criteria such as those we have outlined above,
the counterparts of Ritchie’s criteria. That is, the metalevel
search could be guided by how candidate object-level sys-
tems performed according to these criteria. For this, the
distinction between internally-parameterised and externally-
parameterised versions of the criteria is important. Whereas
the externally-parameterised version (using human judge-
ments or other measures) is exactly appropriate for proﬁl-
ing or assessing the success of the object-level system, the
internally-parameterised version (using N and V) are the
only ones that make sense within the creative (metalevel)
system itself.
This glosses over the signiﬁcant question of whether
a real creative program would be implemented with the
meta/object strata of the CSF, or whether the formal frame-
work is only a way of describing, at some fairly abstract
level, what creative systems do (or could do). It is possible
that the actual use of structured criteria which compare rat-
ings of initial sets and of reachable concepts would not be
realistically applicable in implemented systems.
Summing up
We have presented a reformalisation of Wiggins’s CSF,
which:
• makes the use of a symbolic language an optional extra
• indicates how search strategies can be formally compared
within the CSF
• clariﬁes the metalevel, deﬁning somemetalevel constructs
in more detail and making explicit some formal compar-
isons.
• shows how Ritchie’s criteria can be adapted, in a number
of ways, to the CSF formalisation, thereby clarifying the
relationship between these frameworks
In this way, we have extended the development of formal
descriptive frameworks for creative systems.
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